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INTRODUCION
In studying the methods by which British industry raises capital today it is
essential to understand the sources from which the capital can be obtained, the
methods whereby it is translated from the lender to the borrower, and the restrictions
which are imposed by controls upon both lender and borrower. For the purpose of
this article we are dealing with the financing of businesses constituted as public
companies with limited liability.
The methods of financing war-time production had considerable influence on
postwar financing and the capital markets. The major requirement in a capitalist
economy is for risk-bearing capital which will carry the burdens or reap the rewards
of free enterprise. Under the existing economy of Great Britain today, circum-
scribed as it is by controls and restrictions as well as heavy taxation, it is difficult
to recognize the prewar concept of free enterprise but, outside the recently national-
ized industries, its principles still remain and are those whereby industrialists still
regulate their affairs.
i939-1945-FNANcrNG THE WAR
In establishing a war economy in 1939 it became necessary for the Government to
direct the energies of industry primarily towards the maintenance of our navy, army,
and air force in effective operation by keeping full supply lines. A system of controls
and regulations for the supply of raw materials grew up and in their wake came the
control of capital for the financing of the war machine, responsibility for which
automatically devolved upon the Treasury.
The money required for this purpose and for nearly all the requirements of
industry at this time was obtained by direct and indirect taxation in the form of
income tax, profit taxes, company excess profits taxes, national defence contributions,
purchase tax; and also from savings which the public placed in Government securities
of all kinds. Government issues were made primarily to provide the necessary
finance for war purposes, but the savings campaign also had as its objective the
removal of surplus spending power from the people so as to avoid inflation.
During this period industry was, broadly speaking, being financed by British
Government securities carrying a low rate of interest. The sources from which these
funds were subscribed were the savings in the hands of the public, surplus funds
available in the banks and industrial companies, and also the income of life assurance
companies. The latter had, indeed, early in the war, voluntarily agreed to support
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Government War Loans with the whole of the increase in their home funds, which
were augmented by the sterling proceeds from requisitioning of overseas invest-
ments which were sold to provide the foreign currency required to finance purchases
of war materials abroad.
The effect of these measures was to canalize the funds of individuals and insti-
tutions, who normally provide industry with its working capital, into Government
securities. The amount of the national debt had therefore risen out of all peace-time
proportions in relation to the capital normally invested in industry.
RECONVERSION TO PEACE
The process of converting industry to peace-time requirements from those of war
was a problem of first-class magnitude, both physically and financially. Industry
needed to re-tool and re-equip itself, to re-design its many peace-time products, to
re-establish old markets, and to seek new. Men from the services had to be absorbed,
re-trained in their old jobs or-for the newcomer-trained afresh. These problems
occupied the country through the later months of x945, the whole of 1946, and in
many cases part of 1947. Where were the materials and money for this job?
The materials were available, although in many cases in short supply, but the
adaptation of war-time plant was not always immediately practicable. It was during
this period, and for the reason that Great Britain, in common with the whole of
Europe, was through force of circumstances non-productive, that the United States
generously made money and materials available under the Marshall Plan to help feed
and sustain us.
The problem of financing this reconstruction period was difficult. There were
fortunate companies whose peace-time production had been equally applicable to
the needs of war and therefore they had no reconversion problem; others whose
peace-time activities had ceased at the outbreak of war had major problems. An
example of this is a catering and restaurant group which switched over from filling
Swiss rolls and buns with cream to filling shells with explosive. The products were
different but the principle of an efficient production line remained the same; never-
theless, their post-war problems were severe.
We have seen that the monetary picture had been distorted owing to the incidence
of taxation-in particular the operation of the excess profits tax, which as its name
implies effectively siphoned off profits made over and above a pre-determined stand-
ard. Few businesses during the war were able to retain profits to assist reconstruction
Of course many old established businesses maintained a healthy financial position
throughout and did not need help if their reconstruction problem was slight, but
many who had major reconversion problems .did need help. Again many had had
their factories damaged by bombing, if not totally destroyed, and their machinery
wrecked.
Initially the problem was solved by bank borrowing. Factories which had been
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built by the Government during the war were sold on advantageous terms to many
of the companies occupying them, and by many such means the Government helped
industry to get on its feet. Inevitably, however, during the period since the war in-
flation had taken place and it became essential for many businesses eventually to con-
vert borrowings and indebtedness into permanent capital in order to avoid straining
bank credit and, at the same time, maintain a satisfactory volume of trade.
Tim CAPITAL MARKET
It is pertinent here to consider the capital market whose services provide the
British capitalist with the finance he requires for his business. The capital market
has been developed by private enterprise and consequently is extremely sensitive and
adaptable. Its foundation is the issuing house, a financial institution which, on the
one hand, keeps itself acquainted with the needs of industry for capital, and, on the
other, with the views and inclinations of investors generally. The industrialist be-
comes dependent upon the specialized experience and services of the issuing house
when the time comes to fund borrowings or otherwise to raise new permanent
capital.
In the postwar period the requirements of industry were many and varied and
the major responsibility of this section of the capital market was, by the most careful
investigation, to satisfy itself that it found capital only for those companies whose
projected or existing peace-time production was essential to the community, whose
businesses were honestly run on sound commercial lines with good management,
and who could put to profitable use the capital they were raising.
In all cases, consideration must be given not only to the circumstances peculiar
to the company under review, such as the existing capital structure, but also to the
general market conditions at the time and the opinions and sentiment prevailing
amongst investors. The market for new issues fluctuates; at times ordinary shares
are popular and at other times preference or loan capital is more easily absorbed.
On occasion certain industries fall under a cloud so that investors will not buy shares
in companies engaged in them.
TOTAL COMPANY ISSUES
"ECONOMIST" NEW BASIS EXPRESSED AS PERCENTAGES
Type of Issue 1938 1939 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
Debenture % .......... 21.16 23.00 5.04 6.71 11.49 6.13 8.95 37.51
Preference % .......... 13.65 11.97 9.42 16.04 19.68 19.20 26.80 10.19
Total fixed-interest-
bearing stocks %.. 34.81 34.97 14.46 22.75 31.17 25.33 35.75 47.70
Ordinary % .......... 65.19 65.03 85.54 77.25 68.83 74.67 64.25 52.30
% 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Totals 2 million ..... 159.7 73.5 107.2 271.2 295.8 236.5 178.7 193.3
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It is interesting to insert here figures prepared by the London Economist on the
amount of money raised in 1938 and 1939 and for the years 1945 to 195o inclusive,
showing the breakdown of the types of security issued. The figures are shown as
percentages and are divided into debentures which include dated loan stock; prefer-
ence shares or preferred shares; and ordinary shares which are the equivalent of the
common stock in an American company.
The first point of interest to note is that in general the bulk of the capital re-
quirement of industry was applied in the form of "risk" capital, or ordinary shares
as we know them, and that the year in which the highest percentage of that type
of capital was provided was 1945, the first year of reconstruction. It evidences the
willingness of the investor or lender to take the risks necessary to refinance industry
at that time. In the succeeding years of 1946 and 1947 the highest total sums were
raised amounting to 271. and 295.8 million pounds respectively, and we see a grad-
ual reduction of the percentage raised in ordinary shares, and an increasing pre-
ponderance going into the preference (or preferred) shares, and, to a lesser extent,
debentures or loan stock.
In 1948 and 1949 we see the growing popularity of the preference shares, which
showed the tendency of the investor or lender in those years to demand greater se-
curity for his money. This was further accentuated in i95o when he was tempted to
buy only the better or best types of preference shares, and in many cases, as a condi-
tion of his investment in industry, began to demand a charge on the assets in the
form of debentures. The wheel has indeed almost turned a full cycle from the days
of 1945 when it was possible to raise considerable sums in the equity of businesses on
only postwar and wartime records, to the situation we are facing today in which the
fullest possible security is required by lenders and only first-class industrial concerns
can raise equity capital, or common stock, on reasonable terms.
This movement has inevitably caused interest and dividend rates to rise and as a
consequence we have seen a tendency among institutions to divest themselves of a
proportion of relatively low-interest-bearing Government securities and to purchase in
their place any available first-class industrial debentures which carry a higher and
more attractive interest rate.
INTEREST RATES
The bulk of the finance required by British industry is obtained in the form of
stocks or shares which become quoted on the London Stock Exchange or provincial
stock exchanges, and it is, therefore, possible to follow the trend of interest rates.
Stock markets generally are moved by three forces: (a) politics, (b) economics,
and (c) sentiment or the attitude of the investor to politics and economics and any
other factor he considers relevant.
Interest rates are determined by the effect these three factors have on markets and
it is interesting to see the trend over the past few years of certain typical classes of
stocks as shown by the yields obtained on certain groups of stocks and shares.
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1938 1939 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950
British Govt. Long-dated
and Irredeemables 3.53 3.78 2.91 2.60 2.87 3.24 3.37 3.57
Selected Industrials
Debentures 4.27 4.62 3.86 3.78 3.88 3.89 3.99 4.o6
Industrial Preference
Shares 4.56 4.84 4.21 4.09 4-10 4.13 4.67 4.91
Industrial Ordinary
Shares 6.28 6.6i 4.55 4.66 4.80 5.03 5.50 5.37
(The above figures are compiled from The Actuaries' Investment Index-Average Yields-published
by The Institute of Actuaries).
Certain facts emerge from these figures. The first is the comparative effectiveness
of the Government's methods of controlling the "gilt-edged" market so as to continue
borrowing and carry out refunding operations at the cheapest rate possible. In
large measure this object has been achieved over the past five years, as it will be
seen that during the postwar period the yield on British Government long-dated
stocks did not rise above the figure for 1938 until i95o. The fall in the price of
Government stocks has continued during 195i and yields have consequently in-
creased beyond the figure shown for i95o.
The second fact is that the industrialist took advantage of the ruling cheap money
period, and by offering rates which appeared tempting in comparison with Gov-
ernment securities frequently got the backing he required. Over the past twelve
months however money has become more difficult to obtain and as a consequence
industry has had to offer comparatively attractive terms for loans.
During 195o and early 1951 a number of companies which are industrial leaders
in Britain raised considerable sums by means of short and medium term loans, some
of which were placed privately without a stock exchange quotation, and some of
which were issued through the normal machinery of the capital market.
A list of these is given below:
The amount raised in this type of security during I95O represented a considerable
part of the total capital issues made by corporate bodies. It is important to note that
of the eleven issues mentioned above only six were made with a stock exchange
quotation. The remaining five totalling 32 million pounds were placed privately,
chiefly in large blocks with insurance companies.
The capital market was particularly open to attractive first-class securities of the
type mentioned above as most insurance companies had funds to invest and very
little stock was available in the market. These issues drew off a very considerable
proportion of the surplus investment cash available, with the result that Government
stocks became relatively unattractive. The funding operation to convert the residue
of 2o9 million pounds of 1949-51 National War Bonds into new 3 per cent Funding
Stock 1966-68 was below expectations, and the following paragraph by the City
Editor of The Times was published on November 14, 1950:'
' P. 8, col. i (Italics supplied).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
SHORT Tm LOANS
1950
Amount Length of
Company Raised Type of Security Life Market
The British Oxygen Co. Ltd.. £ 4,000,000 3Y4% Unsecured Loan 3- 5 years PlacedStock privately.
Cadbury Bros. Ltd .......... £ 3,000,000 4% Unsecured Notes 8-13 years Placed
privately.
The Distillers Co. Ltd ....... £ 4,000,000 3Y2% Unsecured Loan 2- 5 years PlacedStock privately.
Goodyear Tyre & Rubber
Co. Ltd .................. £ 1,500,000 4% Redeemable 5-20 years Stock exchange
Debenture Stock quotation.
Imperial Chemical Industries
Limited ................. £20,000,000 4% Unsecured Loan 8-10 years PlacedStock privately.
Imperial Tobacco Co.
(of Great Britain and
Ireland) Ltd ............. £20,000,000 4% Unsecured Loan 10-20 years Stock exchange
Stock quotation.
Lewis Berger & Sons Ltd.... £ 1,000,000 4% Unsecured Loan 5-10 years Stock exchangeStock quotation.
Lever Bros. and Unilever
Ltd ..................... £10,000,000 34% Redeemable 5-25 years Stock exchangeDebenture Stock quotation.
The Morgan Crucible Co.
Ltd ..................... £ 1,000,000 4% Guaranteed Loan 5-10 years Placed
Stock privately.
1951
Gallaher Ltd ............... £ 2,000,000 4% Unsecured Loan 9-14 years Stock exchangeStock quotation.
Godfrey Phillips Ltd ........ £ 2,000,000 43/ Unsecured Loan 10-15 years Stock exchangeStock quotation.
THE CONVERSION RESULT
The residue of C209m. of 1949-51 National War Bonds has been reduced to some
Iniim. by the offer to holders to convert into the new 3 per Cent. Funding Stock x966-
68. The Treasury announced last evening that approximately C88m. of the War Bonds
had been tendered for conversion. This figure excludes bonds on the Post Office Register,
but as these must be very small any further conversions will not affect the result materially.
In one respect the figure of £88m. is well below expectations. It was believed before-
hand that C15om. or so of the maturing bonds were already held by the public depart-
ments, who would presumably convert into the new stock. The actual total tendered for
conversion suggests either that the departments have chosen in fact to retain a substantial
proportion of their holdings for redemption on February i or that they had already
disposed of most of them before the latest offer. On the whole this last seems to be the
more likely explanation. The departments had an earlier opportunity, in June, of con-
verting into 2/2 per Cent. Funding Loan, 1956-61, and there have been other opportu-
nities doubtless in the rising market for the Funds since then of peddling out stock to
ordinary buyers.
If this is true, however, then the buyers must have been the large corporate and institu-
tional investors, for the money market is not thought to hold any quantity of the maturing
bonds; and the present conversion result means that these corporate investors do not want
a 3 per cent. ,6-,8-year Government stock. They may well feel that there may be more,
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profitable opportunities for employing the redemption moneys next year in taking up more
short-term industrial note issues.
Tim INVESTOR
The chief supporters of the capital market today are the insurance companies,
pension funds, the investment trusts, and, to a limited extent, the merchant banking
houses and private investors. The two last named are not important factors. The
merchant banks during a period of inflation and active trade are usually fully ex-
tended in financing trade. The private investor, owing to the incidence of high taxa-
tion, has to a large extent ceased to have surplus funds available year by year out of
income and is left with his permanent capital-if any-which in most cases he is
reluctant to venture outside safe securities.
We are left, therefore, with the investment trusts, insurance companies, and
pension funds. Investment trusts are currently precluded-by government regulation
-from raising large sums of fresh capital, but they may, if they so wish, raise a sum
of not more than £50,00o annually in any one company. Very few have taken ad-
vantage of this concession and their market activities are therefore confined to switch-
ing operations and the investment of normal surplus income.
The only investors with new funds continually available for investment are there-
fore the insurance companies and pension funds. The savings of the man in the
street are now, to a great extent, channelled into the insurance companies in the
form of life or endowment insurance, educational policies, house mortgages, and
many other types of policies. Subscriptions to pension funds in many cases become
almost a condition of employment. The attraction to the public of these forms of
savings lies in the fact that a substantial measure of relief from the personal income
tax is allowed on premiums and pension contributions, and thereby such policies
contain an element of additional saving beyond the normal premiums payable.
INSURANCE COMPANIES
From the preceding paragraph it will be appreciated that the major continuing
source of fresh funds for the capital market comes from the life assurance companies,
and the following table shows the net income which was available from this source
in the years 1945-1949.
The investment policy of the insurance companies, as a whole, is dictated by their
need to provide life cover rather than profits, and maintenance of capital values is
therefore of paramount importance. The rise or fall in price of a security which is to
NET INCOME OF LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANIES IN UNITED KINGDOM
(Ordinary and Industrial Business)
4. thousands
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
£92,348 £ii,6I3 £112,844 £23,514 £I20,703
(Figures obtained from The Annual Abstract of Statistics, published by The Central Statistical office,
and advance information received from The Statistics Division of The Board of Trade).
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be held to maturity is not of major importance except to the extent that current
market prices are used to value stocks in the annual balance sheets.
As explained previously the insurance companies during the war had agreed to
utilize the whole of their home premium income in the support of Government
issues, and as a result, at the end of the war, the amount invested in this type of
security had increased considerably over prewar totals.
This fact should be borne in mind, and also that post-war investment policy has
largely been dictated by government action or decree. Soon after the war the
Socialist Government then in power defined its investment policy and issued instruc-
tfons to the Treasury, which were transmitted to the banks, for the control of credit.
It set up a Capital Issues Committee which operates with the Treasury in controlling
not only the amount of capital raised through the capital market but also the di-
rection in which funds so raised are used. A company requiring fresh capital must
submit proof to this Committee, by reference to the various ministries or national
boards within whose sphere it operates, that its activities are of national importance
and its requirements reasonable and well founded.
The Government's cheap money policy, as we have seen, also had a considerable
effect on markets and consequently on investment policy. British insurance com-
panies are not required by law to utilize a fixed proportion of their funds in Gov-
ernment securities, but prudence requires that they should do so, and, as a result,
a very considerable percentage is always invested in what are termed "gilt-edged"
securities. A further high percentage is in British municipal and corporation stocks,
colonial government stocks, and loans on mortgages, policies and rates.
We are indebted to The Prudential Assurance Company Limited of London for
permission to use a table compiled by them summarizing the distribution of assets
of twelve large British insurance companies. The figures include general as well as
life fund assets:
For reasons already discussed the proportion of British Government securities in-
creased during the war from 26.56 per cent in 1938 to 39.08 per cent in 1943 but it is
also interesting to note that during the years to 1949 this figure had again increased to
43.51 per cent.
Loans on mortgages, policies, rates, and other securities, excluding stocks and
shares, declined from 12.22 per cent in 1938 to 6.32 per cent in 1949. Municipal and
county stocks declined from 4.14 per cent to 1.64 per cent; stocks and shares remained
almost stationary, the respective figures being 1938-16.57 per cent, and 1949-16.86
per cent, although the sum invested increased from approximately 149 million
pounds, to 243 million pounds. The only other major change was in the item "Mis-
cellaneous" which rose from 5.74 per cent to 7.55 per cent, or 51 million pounds to
io9 million pounds. Debentures declined slightly in value from 1492 million
pounds to x47 million pounds, but their percentage of the total invested funds
dropped from i6.6i per cent to io.i9 per cent. -In considering these figures we must
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DIsTRBUTION OF ASSETS
193 1940 1943 1949
Mortgages including Loans on
Stocks and Shares ...........
Loans on Policies ..............
Loans on Rates ...............
Loans on Personal Security .....
Loans on Life Interests and
Reversions ..................
British Government Securities..
Municipal and County United
Kingdom ...................
Indian & Colonial Governments.
Indian & Colonial Provincial
Securities ...................
Indian & Colonial Municipal
Securities ...................
Foreign Governments ..........
Foreign Provincial Securities ....
Foreign Municipal Securities ....
Debentures ..................
Stocks and Shares .............
Land & House Property
Ground Rents ...............
Life Interest and Reversions ....
Miscellaneous .................
Total .................... £900,398,827 £946,837,172 11,054,951,095 I£1,444,319,735
Note: The percentage figures represent the proportion of total assets.
bear in mind that the total funds invested increased from 900,398,827 pounds in
1938 to 1,444,319,735 pounds in 1949, an increase of some 543 million pounds or over
6o per cent. The increase of British Government securities from 239,145,991 pounds
(26.56 per cent) in 1938 to 628,376,583 pounds (43.51 per cent) in 1949 absorbed some
389 million pounds, or over 70 per cent, of the available surplus. It would appear,
therefore, that during this period these companies had invested a more than pro-
portionate amount in this type of security.
It should not be assumed that insurance companies were less willing to invest
in industry during the post-war years, but rather that they were unable to find a
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0.02%
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0.20%
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40,129,543
4.24%
45,192,814
4.77%
2,113,063
0.22%
8,513,049
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39,48,685
4.17%
1,141,703
0.12%
3,062,482
0.32%
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509,248
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30,274,624
2.87%
139,378
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1,664,755
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2,920,050
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6,371,726
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68,017,172
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472,885
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16.86%
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0.02%
109,055,645
7.55%
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sufficiently high percentage of suitable industrial securities, and consequently turned
to the "gilt-edged" market to invest surplus funds. The favorable reception accorded
to the short-term issues of high quality in the latter half of i95o, shows the readiness
of insurance companies and other investors to absorb attractive industrial issues.
Considerable investment demand arose also in the first quarter of 1951 for first
class ordinary shares as a hedge against continued inflation, but this movement be-
came less evident towards the middle of the summer and by the autumn had vir-
tually ceased.
INVESTMENT TRUSTS
The investment trusts are not a considerable source of new funds for the market
as they can only provide surplus income for this purpose.
A table showing the distribution of assets of twelve of the larger British investment
trusts is given below, with the changes which have taken place since 1938.
INVESTMENT TRusTs-DIsTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
1938 1941 1943 1945 1947 1949 1950
Bonds and Debentures .......... 26.66% 29.30% 27.07% 26.51% 21.30% 16.14% 14.87%
Preference Stocks and Shares ..... 28.69% 26.07% 28.53% 29.75% 27.07% 25.74% 23.99%
Ordinary Stocks and Shares ...... 44.65% 44.63% 44.40% 43.74% 51.63% 58.12% 61.14%
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
The above table can give only a slight indication of the changes which have
taken place in this group of representative companies. The figures are taken from
the balance sheets of the various companies and in most cases the value put upon
the stocks and shares is at cost price and not market value. As this basis has to be
used the changes in the market value of portfolios is not apparent. The effect of
price rises and falls in the three groups shown above is not therefore reflected in the
figures until such time as sales of one class take place and funds are transferred to
another.
Movements are however seen from 1945 onwards when stock market activity
increased and a general trend is shown. From 1945 to 195o bonds and debentures
were reduced from 26.51 per cent to 14.87 per cent; preference shares reduced from
29.75 per cent to 23.99 per cent and, as a consequence, holdings of ordinary stocks
and shares increased from 43.74 per cent to 61.14 per cent. The broad generalization,
therefore, emerges that the investment trusts became less interested in fixed-interest-
bearing securities and more interested in ordinary shares-or the equity of industry.
The holdings of these investment trusts included American and foreign securities.
Over the past two or three years certain of the important investment trust groups
have been reverting to a pre-war practice of investing a percentage of their funds
in United States and Canadian stocks.
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As American stocks have become available these groups have been buyers of
them and consequently sellers of British stocks and shares. The devaluation of ster-
ling produced considerable increases in book values (in sterling) of American
holdings and many trusts purchased additional stocks and shares to average existing
holdings. There is an added attraction for the British investor in holding American
stocks in that by the operation of the Double Taxation Agreement between the two
countries a relief from part of British income tax is obtained on income received from
American stocks and shares, which has the effect of increasing the yields obtainable,
in some cases to very attractive levels.
INvEsrmENT TRENDs
As we have seen, there was a much greater disposition in 1945 and 1946 to put
up "risk" capital for business in the form of ordinary shares than in 1950. This
has produced a very definite movement as in order to make successful issues and in-
sure that the required capital is forthcoming, companies concerned are compelled
by the requirements of the investor to make offers of shares to their shareholders
on attractive terms well below the market prices ruling.
This applies even to the leading industrial concerns and the following are some
examples:
The urgent needs of industry for capital, in some cases required to finance the
purchase of raw materials which have risen steeply in price in the past two years,
could often only be met by the issue of prior charges-debentures or loan stock or
preference shares. The accompanying table which compares the capital structure in
1941 and 1950 of eight British and eight American companies engaged in the same
industries illustrates the trend.
IssUEs TO SHAREHOLDERS ON BONUS TExvms
Price at Market
Cash raised which Price
Company by Ordinary Date of Offered to Ratio at Time
Issues Issue Shareholders of Issue
1950
English Electric Co. Ltd ............. £1,032,130 January 35/- 1 for 6 42/6d.
Boots Pure Drug Co. Ltd ............ £2,240,000 March 35/- 1 for 5 48/-
The British Oxygen Co. Ltd .......... £2,428,370 November 70/- 1 for 5 90/-
Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd .............. £8,941,890 November 40/- 21 for 5 64/-
British Aluminum Co. Ltd ........... £3,400,000 November 34/- 2 for 3 42/6d.
Canadian Eagle Oil Co ............... £4,998,470 November 22/- 7 for 30 27/6d.
Rolls-Royce Ltd .................... £1,437,500 December 75/- 1 for 3 113/9d.
1951
J. Lyons & Co. Ltd..........2,970,000 January 90/- 1 for 3 101/3d.
Metal Industries Ltd ............... £1,013,330 March 32/6d 1 for 4 42/-
De Havilland Aircraft Ltd ........... £1,644,547 June 20/- 9 for 10 27/9d.
Hambros Bank Ltd ................. £2,250,000 June 45/- 5 for 2 65/9d.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
(2)
Preference or (3) (4)
(1) Preferred Total Prior Ordinary
Debentures Capital Charges Capital
expressed as expressed as expressed as expressed as
% of total % of total % of total % of total
Companies Capital Capital Capital Capital
1941 1950 1941 1950 1941 1950 1941 1950
American Tobacco Co ........... 9.13 54.43 28.86 12.67 37.99 67.10 62.01 32.90
The Imperial Tobacco Co .............. 44.23 25.50 14.22 25.50 58.45 74.50 41.55
Armour & Co. (Illinois) ............... 65.85 73.60 24.28 73.60 90.13 26.40 9.87
IAebig's Extxract of Meat ................... 33.33 50.00 33.33 50.00 66.67 50.00
Celanese Corp. of America ....... 43.55 32.06 54.52 66.24 98.07 98.30 1.93 1.70
British Celanese ................. 23.73 30.94 57.46 53.73 81.19 84.67 18.81 15.33
Du Pont de Nemours & Co ................. 43.28 54.54 43.28 54.54 56.72 45.46
Imperial Chemical Industries .......... 19.11 32.08 23.01 32.08 42.12 67.92 57.88
Firestone Tire & Rubber ........ 40.98 48.29 41.69 10.75 82.67 59.04 17.33 40.96
Dunlop Rubber Co .............. 19.93 30.89 27.67 23.79 47.60 54.68 52.40 45.32
Goodyear Tire & Rubber ........ 36.36 59.37 54.34 33.81 90.70 93.18 9.30 6.82
Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co.
(Great Britain) ..................... 42.85 33.33 34.29 33.33 77.14 66.67 22.86
Monsanto Chemical U. S. A ........... 35.55 58.49 39.11 58.49 74.66 41.51 25.34
Monsanto Chemical Ltd ..................... 57.14 62.50 57.14 62.50 42.86 37.50
The United States Steel ......... 15.91 5.09 29.91 27.79 45.82 32.88 54.18 67.12
John Summers ....................... 34.53 ..... 20.72 ..... 55.25 100.00 44.75
(Compiled from Moodys' Services).
With the exception of two American companies-Firestone Tire and Rubber
and United States Steel-the equity or common stock percentages of capital de-
creased, and with the exception again of those two companies the proportion of
the total capital in prior charges was increased between those years.
It would appear from all figures which have been quoted that there has been a
definite trend in the new issue market up to i95o towards security and away from
equities, except in first-class businesses. This has tended to produce top-heavy capital
structures in which prior charges predominate. The movement appears to have gone
further in America than in the United Kingdom and appears to be inevitable during
a period of combined political unrest and inflation which causes industry to require
increasing loan facilities and credit to maintain trading turnover.
TYPES OF SECURITY
In the postwar period the types of security offered on the capital market varied
from the straight debenture stock, preference and ordinary share to short-term con-
vertible loan notes and redeemable participating preference shares. Unorthodox
types of security are a product and symptom of the times. British companies in
addition to paying income tax on their profits and also a io per cent profits tax, must
pay a further tax on all distributed dividends which at present is at the rate of 40
per cent of the sum distributed. The io per cent profits tax and 40 per cent distribu-
tion tax can become extremely onerous for a company financed with a preponderance
of preference or preferred capital carrying a high fixed dividend or coupon rate. De-
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bentures, notes, and loan stock do not attract the 40 per cent distribution tax and,
therefore, are more attractive to borrowers. As a generalization therefore companies
prefer to raise capital by means of debentures, loan stock or unsecured notes, instead of
by preference, preferred or ordinary shares which attract this distribution tax, pro-
vided always that the capital structure is not thrown out thereby or bank credit
affected.
To increase the attraction of preference shares it has sometimes been necessary to
introduce a feature of redemption, or convertibility into ordinary shares. Insurance
companies like to have redemption features in small companies so that they can
envisage the ultimate liquidation of their holding. Such shares often impose an
obligation on the company to apply, year by year, a certain proportion of its profit to
provide a sinking fund or to carry out redemption by annual drawings. The cost
of such sinking fund or drawings is not allowed as an expense of the company for
taxation purposes and must bear tax at the current rates before being deducted from
the trading profits for the year. There is a further obligation that if the sinking
fund does not provide for the total extinction of the issue within the term of its
life, then provision must be made on the final redemption date for the replacement
or repayment of that portion which has not been redeemed meantime.
During the past two years considerable amounts of capital have been raised by
means of short-term unsecured loan notes carrying attractive rates of interest. These
have been mostly issued by companies requiring temporary finance in addition to
their normal banking facilities to cover the increased cost of raw materials.
Holders of these notes rank as ordinary creditors of a company and in most cases
the bank ranks before them. In other words, the holder of such a security becomes
an ordinary trade creditor of the business and if liquidation occurs receives only
the same treatment as a trade creditor, but is paid out in priority to preference or
ordinary shareholders.
In some cases notes have carried a provision for conversion into ordinary shares
at certain specified dates during the term of the life of the notes.
CONCLUSION
There are one or two points of interest in the attitude and practice of the insti-
tutional investor which influence the methods of raising money for financing busi-
nesses. Insurance companies and investment trusts avoid acquiring majority hold-
ings in any concern and do not seek to purchase the entire equity of any business.
A majority or total equity holding in a business makes it a subsidiary and might
impose the obligation of managing, or supervising the management, of such a busi-
ness. Insurance companies and investment trusts are not in a position to provide
technical or industrial management and can only provide, if required, financial
direction. In certain cases therefore syndicates are formed to finance companies, or
acquire large lines of share capital therein. Such syndicates are formed, not infre-
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quently, of insurance companies, investment trusts, merchant bankers, and others
having funds to invest. Latterly, former coal and iron and steel companies, who
have acquired cash as a result of the nationalization of their industries, have been
making investments by this method.
Investment trusts, insurance companies, and other institutional investors are
quite willing to invest in shares which have no quotation on any stock exchange
provided that a sufficiently generous yield is obtainable to compensate for lack of
marketability.
From the above necessarily brief study of the methods of financing British in-
dustry since the war it can be appreciated that nearly every known method of raising
money has been used. Throughout i95i, the capital market has operated cautiously
and on conservative lines, but there is ample evidence that British institutional in-
vestors will continuously seek to acquire equity holdings of proved merit and value
and in every way assist in the development of British industry.
